The governance of Taiwan PSM is legalized by an independent governing board. This model is championed itself within the Asia-Pacific region recognized by RSF (Reporter sans Frontières) and Freedom House respectively. However, the system is failed to work well again in Sept. 2019. The biggest obstacle to nominate the board member is struggled with the minority vote. According to the Article 13, Public Television Act, the critical vote by minority is affirmed by the approval of board member casts the ballot upon receiving three-fourths of Review Committee Members’ votes. The Committee, composed of social representatives, is appointed by General Parliamentary Proceedings. Now, the 7th term of PSM (named as Public Television Service, PTS) Governing Board is postponed to establish after the previous one expired already two quarters before. The disagreement against the candidates by minority of committee members is went without compromise due to different ideologies born with PSM governing.
Originally, the PTS Act stipulated the approval of board members into the hands of the Committee by nearly reaching the consensus on agreement. In defense of media independence, the mandate of PSM board is highly prevented any control from any infiltrate political forces by stepping up the votes of approval. In return, the establishment of each term of Board is time-consuming and revolving with the wrestling of political proxies behind the scene.
This particularity of PSM independence is studies by this research. The paper proposed to envision this local problematic of PSM with the international perspective. The methodology of researching the Taiwan problem is done through a comparative legal documenting analysis. The reform and solution to this impasse is the purpose of conducting the survey. Built on the mandate and remit of PSB regionally, the research will analyze the legal handbooks published by European Broadcasting Union, Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, UNESCO, World Bank, and Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD). It is presumably generalized out the necessary requirement of capability for being governor in PSM board as follows: mandate, nationalism, role-playing, ethics, knowledge, conflict interest avoidance. The result shall check balance against the current one in Taiwan PSM nomination.
This paper is working toward a reform criticism on Taiwan situation of PSM independence. By removing the parliamentary directly approval, the transparency is gradually under-performed for the sake of free from partisan influence. The benefits of such proxy politics nomination is not great enough to reject the international standard of appointing governor. The affirming independent and diversity of governing board representatives shall consider another perspective for the way of future in emphasizing the corporate control and political wills. Those two factors are the main goals of sustaining the PSM power and duty set out by Law and guiding Handbook generated by global or regional consensus.